Growing the Civic Mind: Civic Education, Civic Behavior, and Political Institutions
The DEMS Economics Seminar series is proud to host
Ingela Alger
(Toulouse School of Economics)
ABSTRACT: Theoretical work shows that in social interactions Kantian (or universalization) concerns sometimes yield starkly different behavioral predictions than other-regarding concerns. We add to this work by arguing that Kantian concerns are strengthened by the salience of the arbitrariness of the role distribution in the interaction. We design an experiment to test this hypothesis, and to disentangle Kantian concerns from other-regard. We do so by varying the salience of role uncertainty. In the experiment, participants decide whether to “sell a lemon” to a willing buyer (akin to a dictator game with taking). Each subject makes these decisions either knowing that the probability of them being in the “seller” role was originally 50% or after simply being informed of their role as “seller”. We also vary the wording used to describe decisions: we implement a Market frame and a Neutral frame. In line with our hypothesis, role uncertainty salience promotes pro-social behaviors (in both frames). We also find that subjects are more likely to “sell a lemon” under the market frame. Structural estimates of the preference parameters indicates that this is driven by a reduced other-regard under the Market frame.
The seminar will be in presence, Room: 4096- Building U7